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ABSTRACT
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are often regarded as the solution for time and
budget overruns in large infrastructural projects, but not all are successful. This raises
the question of what really makes PPPs work. Focusing on the role of relational
aspects, this article examines the degree to which trust and managerial activities
correlate to the perceived performance and cooperation process in PPP projects. A
multilevel analysis of survey data from 144 respondents involved in Dutch PPP
projects shows that both trust and management correlate significantly to the per-
ceived performance of these projects. Moreover, trust is associated with a good
cooperation process.
KEYWORDS Public–private partnerships; PPP; trust; management; collaborative governance
Introduction: trust and management as conditions for successful PPP
The last two decades have seen a growing trend towards the use of public–private
partnerships (PPPs) to provide service delivery and realize large infrastructural projects.
The suggestion that PPPs can realize more innovative projects more efficiently than
traditional procurement forms is at the heart of this trend (Ghobadian et al. 2004; Hodge,
Greve, and Boardman 2010). Especially in the transport infrastructure sector – where
projects are often confronted with time delays and cost overruns (e.g. Flybjerg 2007;
Cantarelli 2011) – PPPs are used frequently. Just like the increased use of PPPs in daily
practice, the academic interest in this phenomenon has grown.
Much research has been carried out on PPPs, but no generally accepted under-
standing of the concept exists (Hodge and Greve 2007). Nonetheless, some aspects,
including durable cooperation between public and private entities, shared risks, and
joint production of either services or products, are shared in most definitions (see
Savas 2000; Klijn and Teisman 2003; Hodge and Greve 2005). Although a variety of
definitions of the term public–private partnership have been suggested, this article
uses the definition proposed by Klijn and Teisman (2003, 137), who defined a PPP as
a ‘cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which
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actors develop mutual products and/or services and in which risks, costs and profits
are shared’. The variety of definitions possibly results from the many forms that PPP
may take. From loosely coupled collaborations to strict contract-based partnerships,
PPPs come in different shapes and sizes. Within this diversity, we focus on one of the
most discussed forms: the DBFM(O) project. This type of partnership is characterized
by long-term contracts integrating the different aspects of construction projects: the
design, building, financing, maintaining, and – occasionally – the operation of the
project (Van Ham and Koppenjan 2002).
Research into PPPs has shown their potential but has also revealed mixed views
on whether their supposed benefits work out in daily practice (e.g. Hodge and
Greve 2005; Hodge and Greve 2007). A much-debated question is what really
makes these contract-based partnerships work. In much of the literature, the
relative importance of the contractual form and the incentives within the contract
are deemed relevant (e.g. Savas 2000; NAO 2002; Steijn, Klijn, and Edelenbos
2011). On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature that recognizes the
importance of the relationship between contractual partners. These scholars high-
light the importance of trust and managerial effort in establishing successful PPP
projects (e.g. Huxham and Vangen 2005; Kort, Verweij, and Klijn 2016). In
another article, we analysed the impact of contractual characteristics on
DBFMO (Design, Built, Finance, Maintenance and Operating) partnerships (see
Klijn and Koppenjan 2016b) and concluded that they were not significantly
related to the (perceived) outcomes of partnerships. Using the same data – a
survey among PPP professionals in the Netherlands – this article explores the
other hypothesis: that the relationship between the partners is pivotal in successful
PPPs.
Thus, this study sets out to assess the significance of relational aspects, more
specifically the role of trust and managerial effort, for PPP performance. Therefore,
the central question in this article is as follows: What is the influence of trust among
contracting parties in public–private partnership projects and the managerial effort in
the project on the (perceived) performance of PPPs?
This article first gives a brief overview of the theoretical arguments for the
influence of trust and management on PPP performance. It then goes on to discuss
the research design and methodology of our study. The fourth section is concerned
with the results of the analysis. Finally, we present the conclusions and reflections on
the research.
Why trust and management matter in PPP
This section first elaborates on the idea of performance in relation to PPP. It then
deals with the question of why trust and managerial effort are potentially important
for PPP performance. It concludes with some hypotheses that are tested against the
survey data.
PPP: better performance and more cooperation
PPPs entail assumptions about better value for money and superior performance
compared to more traditionally tendered projects (see Savas 2000; Hodge and Greve
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2005). Nevertheless, the question remains as to how to define good performance. PPP
performance can be conceptualized in roughly two ways.
On the one hand, a narrow definition of performance includes the achievement of
particular targets and the efficiency in achieving those targets, such as on-time and on-
budget delivery and increased efficiency, thanks to life cycle optimizations. In contract-
based PPPs, these targets can be found in the contract. The issue with this narrow
definition is that it provides information on only a small part of the project. Scholars
argue that project performance can also be conceptualized more broadly ‘beyond the
contract.’ Focusing on the wider support for the project and the durability of the
solution for the future adds an extra dimension to the concept of performance. As
various scholars argue, several distinctive criteria are needed to assess PPP perfor-
mance (e.g. Van Ham and Koppenjan 2002; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008). We follow
that line of thought by combining five dimensions in measuring PPP performance.
These dimensions have often been mentioned by scholars in earlier research (e.g.
Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Steijn, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2011) and include effectiveness
of the solution offered, support, integral character of the solution, robustness (durable
solution for the future), and cost effectiveness (efficiency).
It is striking that both the narrow definition and the broader definition focus only
on the outcome of the project by measuring performance. The crucial argument in
the ‘grey literature’ (including audit commission pieces, consultancy reports, and
policy documents) is that long-term contracts and private involvement lead to better
cooperation and relations between (public and private) partners; this is also relevant
for good PPP performance (see NAO 2002; Algemene Rekenkamer 2013). To take
into account good cooperation as part of PPP performance, this study includes a
number of indicators that focus on the cooperation between public and private actors
(based on, for example, Huxham and Vangen 2005; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008).
These include the resolution of conflicts between partnerships, the presence of
deadlocks, and the gradual course of cooperation between partners during the entire
process.
So, performance is not merely about on-time and on-budget delivery. It is a
combination of good outcomes and good cooperation that will result in successful
PPPs.
Trust in PPPs
One of the most important scholars of neo-institutional theory, an important theo-
retical underpinning of PPP, Williamson argues that trust is a more or less redundant
concept in economic transactions based on contracts (Williamson 1996). However, a
wide and prominent part of the literature on contractual relations and alliances
contradicts this statement, emphasizing the importance of trust in partnerships.
This section provides more insight into the trust concept, explaining the concept
and its relevance for PPPs.
As an intensively studied concept, trust is defined in many ways. In spite of the
variety of definitions of trust, generally there is agreement on the idea that to trust a
person is to expect that the other will refrain from opportunistic behaviour, even if
the opportunity arises (Deakin and Michie 1997; Deakin and Wilkinson 1998). The
trusting actor assumes that the other will take his/her interests into account, although
he/she can never be certain about it (Rousseau et al. 1998; Nooteboom 2002). This
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can be perceived as taking a risk, because the partner becomes vulnerable to oppor-
tunistic behaviour. This risk is taken in the belief that the other party can be trusted.
When actors communicate openly about their intentions, honour existing commit-
ments, or collaborate without misusing each other’s vulnerabilities, trust will develop.
Trust needs to be actively developed and maintained through interaction. Without
interaction, trust will easily diminish (Giddens 1984; Nooteboom 2002).
Most authors agree that trust is inextricably related to risk. Without risk, the
notion of trust is simply unnecessary (Rousseau et al. 1998; Lane and Bachman 1998;
Nooteboom 2002). In contractual relations, partnerships, or other cooperative rela-
tions involving private and public actors, the actors are confronted with various risks.
One of the risks is that an actor will abuse his power in the project or abandon the
cooperation, forcing the other actor to bear the costs. The strategic complexities in
PPP make it difficult for actors to foresee all the possible contingencies, reason them
out, or calculate them accurately (Deakin and Wilkinson 1998; Koppenjan and Klijn
2004). If there is trust in the partnership, the actors no longer need to calculate all
possible negative outcomes, because they expect the other party to take their interests
into consideration. Trust is crucial for partnerships to function properly. Without
trust, it is unlikely that actors will engage in risk-taking behaviour because it can be
‘punished’ by opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, it is more difficult to reach satis-
factory outcomes (Bromily and Harris 2006; Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010;
Nooteboom 2002; Rousseau et al. 1998). So, our first theoretical conclusion is that
trust is an indispensable concept when studying PPPs.
A vast amount of literature on the role of trust in alliances (e.g. Sako 1998;
Bachman and Zaheer 2006) and collaborative governance (Huxham and Vangen
2005; Ansell and Gash 2008) presents several arguments for the importance of
trust in partnerships. First, trust facilitates cooperation. Because trust creates
greater predictability, it reduces the risks inherent in transactions and cooperative
relations (Nooteboom 2002; Sako 1998). Trust also reduces the necessity for
highly detailed contracts. Thick contracts are costly and often inadequate in
complex cooperation processes (Miles and Snow 1986; Grabher 1993; Parker
and Vaidya 2001). Therefore, very strict and detailed contracts are counterpro-
ductive for the development of creative ideas. When trust is present, partnerships
can function with less detailed contracts, leaving more room for creativity (see
Parker and Vaidya 2001). The third argument for the importance of trust is that
trust solidifies cooperation. Trust increases the probability that actors will invest
resources like knowledge, time, and energy in the partnership, even when the
return on investment is uncertain. From an economic perspective, this would
constrain actors from investing, but the presence of trust creates stability in the
relationship. This compensates for the uncertainty in partnerships and creates a
strong basis for long-term cooperation (Sako 1998; Parker and Vaidya 2001; Ring
and Van Der Ven 1992). Fourth, trust enhances performance. As stated, trust
stimulates the exchange of information and knowledge that is essential for facil-
itating the learning process and achieving new solutions (Nooteboom 2002). In
the literature, there is broad consensus on the idea that a learning process in
which actors exchange information and learn from one another is critical to
develop new solutions (Schön and Rein 1994; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). So,
trust can be seen as an efficient way to lower transaction costs in collaborations
(Parker and Hartley 2003). Trust therefore plays a major role in relational
4 R. WARSEN ET AL.
contracting, where formal contractual agreements are combined with more infor-
mal social mechanisms. At its best, relational contracting is based on high levels
of trust, cooperation, informality, and shared problem-solving. Despite the fact
that many PPPs (including DBFMO projects) are based mainly on transactional
contract-based relationships, aspects of relational contracting and trust-based
relationships may occur in these partnerships (Reeves 2008).
The role of network management
Many scholars distinguish between project management (managing given contents
and goals, and controlling time and budget) and inter-organization management,
where both the relations between partners and those with the network around the
project are managed (see Steijn, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2011). The latter form of
management, often referred to as network management, is essential for organizing
complex governance processes, such as PPP projects (McGuire and Agranoff 2011;
Klijn and Koppenjan 2016a). Because of the complex nature of PPPs, network
management activities or strategies are critical for achieving good outcomes (see
O’Toole 1988; Steijn, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2011; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). This
implies the use of internal management activities to manage the interactions between
partners in the partnership, but also to manage the environment of the project. This
argument builds on earlier research on strategic alliances that also emphasizes the
importance of managing relational characteristics in order to achieve good results in
partnerships (e.g. Niederkofler 1991; Borys and Jemison 1989).
If we see PPPs not only as an organizational construction but also as a
network, the literature on network management is especially interesting because
it also focuses on managing the network in which the project is embedded. In the
literature on network management, frequently mentioned management and lea-
dership strategies include initiating and facilitating interaction processes between
actors (Friend, Power, and Yewlett 1974), for instance, by activating (or de-
activating) actors and resources. Moreover, management strategies encompass
the creation and change of network arrangements for better coordination
(Scharpf 1978; Rogers and Whetten 1982) as well as the realization of new content
and win–win situations (Mandell 2001), for example, by exploring new ideas,
working with scenarios, organizing joint research, and joint fact-finding (Klijn
and Koppenjan 2016a). Finally, management strategies also include guiding inter-
actions (Gage and Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). The
literature on collaborative governance and collaborative advantages mentions
similar activities. Huxham and Vangen (2005) mention activities like mobilizing
member organizations, dealing with power relations, empowering actors that can
deliver collaborative aims, and trust building. Ansell and Gash (2008) mention
strategies like committing to the process, creating shared understanding, and
aiming for participatory inclusiveness.
Research shows that two types of network management strategies seem to have
the most impact: exploring and connecting (Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010; see,
for comparable findings, Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Exploring strategies are
aimed at creating and looking at new solutions, collecting (joint) information,
organizing research, and combining conflicting points of view. Connecting stra-
tegies are aimed at activating actors and resources, linking actors together,
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nurturing inter-organizational relations, and dealing with conflicts. We focus on
these two strategies in this article.
Hypotheses about trust and management
The previous arguments lead us to the theoretical conclusion that trust, as an
intention and a perception of actors, is positively correlated with performance in
PPPs. Trust enables actors to share more information and innovate, and this
results in better outcomes. Trust will also enhance the cooperation process, seen
as cooperative activities. Actors will invest more in cooperation when the level of
trust is higher, resulting in better cooperation between public and private actors.
This results in the first two hypotheses:
H1: PPP projects with a higher level of trust between the public and the private
partners will be characterized by a higher (perceived) performance.
H2: PPP projects with a higher level of trust between the public and the private
partners will be characterized by better cooperation between the partners.
Network management strategies are expected to relate positively to both good
performance and good cooperation. Intensive network management – by connect-
ing actors and exploring content – will enhance the possibilities of actors finding
satisfactory solutions and implementing them (better performance). Network
management will foster cooperation, because coordination activities are being
performed and attempts are being made to increase the mutual development of
goals and the collection of information. We acknowledge that network manage-
ment and trust could potentially influence each other over time. To deal with this
issue, respondents were asked to rank the level of trust at the time of the survey.
Respondents were asked to classify various network management activities in the
project that had (usually) been performed in the past period. So, in our measure-
ment, network management precedes trust. There are also theoretical arguments
to perceive the relation in this way. Network management consists of deliberate,
active interventions in the process to facilitate and stimulate the project interac-
tions and outcomes, and to improve the relation between partners (see Klijn and
Koppenjan 2016a; Huxham and Vangen 2005; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). So,
from a theoretical point of view, this seems to be the most logical correlation.
Thus, our next two hypotheses are as follows:
H3: The more network management strategies are employed in PPP projects, the
better the projects will perform.
H4: The more network management strategies are employed in PPP projects, the
better the cooperation between (public and private) partners will be.
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Methodology
Survey and variables
The data used in this article stem from a survey (March 2014–June 2014) among
Dutch practitioners involved in PPPs. In order to identify these practitioners, a list
was compiled of all officially known PPP projects in the Netherlands by studying
publicly available PPP databases in the Netherlands. These included databases of both
ministries and ministerial support bureaus. So, the survey represents approximately
the whole population of officially known Dutch PPP projects up to 2014. By includ-
ing almost the entire population in our study, we avoid many of the issues with
regard to representation as described in the total survey error framework (see, for
example, Groves and Lyberg 2010 or Lee, Benoit-Bryan, and Johnson 2012).
Coverage or sampling errors, which arise in the process of selecting a sample from
a target population, are therefore most likely not present in our study. Subsequently,
respondents who were directly involved in these projects were selected to participate
in the study. These potential respondents worked mainly for the public commission-
ing authority or the private contractor, for example, as project manager, contract
manager, or technical manager. However, respondents who were involved in an
advisory role – working for consultancy or law firms – were also selected. All
respondents were closely involved in (a specific phase of) one of the PPP projects.
In total, 343 respondents involved in 93 PPP projects received a request to fill in the
survey. With a response rate of 46.6%, 144 respondents filled in the survey. These
respondents worked for 68 different Dutch PPP projects, of which the majority were
DBM or DBFM(O) projects. Consequently, the survey covered 73% of the then existing
PPP projects in the Netherlands. Because of this response rate, the risk of nonresponse
error might be less of an issue in this study (Lee, Benoit-Bryan, and Johnson 2012). With
144 respondents answering questions about 68 projects, there were multiple respondents
per project. In the section on ‘Data analysis,’we discuss the implications of the multilevel
structure of the data for the data analysis. As stated, the respondents were mainly
employed in public organizations (45.8%) or private contracting parties (27.1%). The
other respondents worked either for consultancy firms (13.2%) or for non-profit orga-
nizations (11.8%) such as housing associations or resident associations. In small-scale
local projects in particular, these stakeholders are involved in the project. The respon-
dents had considerable experience working in complex projects, asserting that, on
average, they had 14 years of experience with such projects. Some of the respondents
were involved in multiple PPP projects, and so, each respondent was asked to select just
one of their projects and answer all questions with that specific project in mind.
Measurement
Perceived project performance
The measurement of project performance poses some challenges. First of all, projects
generally consist of various actors; this means that multiple goals are present within a
single project. Because of the various actors’ different interests, it is difficult to select one
overarching goal in which all actors feel represented. Furthermore, projects usually have
a lengthy time span. Consequently, actors’ goals are likely to change over time conse-
quent to a readjustment of preferences as a result of learning or goal displacement (Klijn
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and Koppenjan 2016a). Additionally, it is not possible to assess objective outcomes with
surveys that measure respondents’ perceptions. Therefore, perceived project perfor-
mance is taken as a proxy for outcomes. In this approach, we follow the work of Klijn,
Edelenbos, and Steijn (2010). Their measurement scales build on different dimensions of
project performance, listed in Table 1. The mean score for perceived project perfor-
mance, as rated by project respondents, is 4.00 (SD = 0.51) on a 5-point Likert scale,
indicating a high satisfaction with the performance of their project.
Cooperation between public and private actors
As stated earlier in this article, the assumption behind PPPs implies that PPPs result
not only in more efficient outcomes, but also in better cooperation between the
partners. Therefore, the performance of PPPs should be measured not only in terms
of outcomes, but also in terms of process. Therefore, this study includes process
criteria in order to measure the cooperation between public and private actors in
PPPs. As performance based on output is substantially different from good coopera-
tion in the PPP process, the different indicators used to construct both variables
cannot be combined. Although the correlation table (see Appendix A) points towards
a medium correlation between the variables, an exploratory factor analysis, presented
in the section on ‘Network management’, clearly shows that performance based on
output and performance based on cooperation are different concepts and that both
are also perceived differently by the respondents. Therefore, we include both concepts
as two different variables in the analysis. The respondents’ perceptions on output-
based performance are referred to in this study as perceived project performance, and
their perceptions of the process are labelled as cooperation. Regarding the process
criteria, both the presence of deadlocks and the way conflicts are settled during the
process are used as indicators for the quality of the cooperation between actors.
Table 2 provides an overview of the dimensions used to measure cooperation, which
has a mean score of 3.40 (SD = 0.76) on a 5-point Likert scale.
Table 1. Measurement of perceived project performance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71).
Dimension Term Item
1. Integral nature of solution INT Different environmental functions have been connected
sufficiently
2. Effectiveness of solution EFF Solutions that have been developed really deal with the problems
at hand
3. Effectiveness in the future FUT Developed solutions are durable for the future
4. Support for solution SUP The project solutions are sufficiently supported by the involved
organizations
5. Relation costs and benefits RCB In general, the benefits exceed the costs
Table 2. Measurement of cooperation between public and private actors (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70).
Dimension Term Item
1. Managing internal
conflicts
MIC The actors involved in the network have succeeded in managing
internal conflicts and disagreements in an adequate manner
2. Presence of deadlocks PDE I did not experience any cumbersome deadlocks during the process
3. Course of cooperation CCO The actors have improved the cooperation process over the past years
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Trust
Tomeasure trust between the contract partnerswithin the project, a 10-point scalewas used
in which respondents rated the amount of trust varying from (1) ‘There is no trust between
public and private partners’ to (10) ‘There is a lot of trust between public and private
partners.’ The mean score of this variable is 6.67 (SD = 1.93) on a 10-point Likert scale.
Network management
This study also focuses on the relation between network management and the
cooperation within, and the performance of, PPPs. In order to do so, a number of
items (see Table 3) on network management focusing on coordination activities
within the project are included. Management activities that focus on external stake-
holders are not taken into account. The mean score for management is 3.87
(SD = 0.57) on a 5-point Likert scale.
For the three variables consisting of more than one item (performance, management,
and cooperation), an exploratory factor analysis was used to check whether the concepts
are valid and reliable and whether the in-between correlations are higher than the
correlations between the variables. The factor analysis (Table 4) shows that the items
Table 3. Measurement of management (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70).
Dimension Term Item
1. Defining principles DPR When information is being collected, the focus is on developing and
establishing common principles and information needs for both public
and private actors in the project
2. Involving partners IPA (Private) Contractors are consulted and involved in project management
decisions
3. Communication COM Much time is spent on the communication between various actors
4. Aligning interests AIN During deadlocks and problems, the management focuses mainly on
aligning conflicting interests
Table 4. Exploratory factor analysis (principal components approach with Varimax rotationa).
Construct Term
Perceived
performance Management Cooperation Cronbach’s alpha
Management DPR .030 .605 .078 0.70
IPA .199 .747 .043
COM .021 .792 .034
AIN .181 .621 .452
Cooperation MIC .296 .132 .699 0.70
PDE .114 −.042 .790
CCO .211 .231 .679
Perceived performance SUP .587 .001 .198 0.71
INT .692 .098 .146
EFF .742 −.059 .339
FUT .713 .213 .284
RCB .576 .333 −.118
aPrincipal components analysis assumes that the sample used is the population, which is the case in this
survey as we included all known PPP projects up to 2014. As it is not the aim of this factor analysis to
generalize the findings beyond the data in this survey, the use of principal components analysis seems fit for
this study. As the different variables are unrelated rather than dimensions of the same concept, Varimax
rotation is preferred over oblique rotation.
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form good constructs and that the variables do not overlap. As theory offers clear
directions towards the underlying relations between the items, we also employed a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) – which is generally more strict – to check for the
validity of the constructs. The CFA showed that most items loaded on their construct
with a score >0.6, but all of the items displayed scores above 0.4, which is sufficient.
Control variables
In the analysis, three control variables that may be associated with performance and
cooperation in PPP projects are included (see Table 5). These control variables were
selected on two different analytical levels. On the one hand, we controlled for a
variable at project level, namely, project phase. This was measured by asking respon-
dents which phases of the project had already been completed, so that we could
correct our results for project phase. To include this variable, we added a dummy
variable called ‘projects phase.’ All projects that had completed the realization phase,
and were thus in the maintenance and/or operational phase, were scored with a ‘1’.
All projects that were still in the construction phase, or even in the tendering phase,
received a ‘0’. We also tested other dummy variables; for example, we included
projects in the construction phase in the list of projects scoring a ‘1’.. Only projects
in the tendering phase then received a ‘0’. However, this did not lead to any
significant changes in the results of the analysis.
On the other hand, control variables at individual respondent level were taken
into account, including respondents’ organizational background (public organiza-
tion, private organization, and other). This variable allowed us to control for the
fact that respondents worked for either the public commissioning authority or the
private contractor. Again a dummy variable was used. In the dummy variable,
called ‘public,’ all respondents working for the project sector scored a ‘1’ and all
respondents who worked in the private sector, for consultancy firms or other
organizations, a ‘0’. Finally, the technical complexity of the project was included.
Although this might seem a variable at project level, we included this variable on
the individual level, because this variable includes each respondent’s individual
perception of the technical complexity of the project. The respondents’ perception
of technical complexity varied depending on individual factors, such as their
technical knowledge and their previous experience with technically complex pro-
jects. So, the technical complexity of a project may be scored differently by the
respondents involved in the project. With regard to scoring the technical complex-
ity of the project, respondents were presented a 10-point scale on whether the
project was characterized by high or low technical complexity. The expectation was
that, in more complex projects, respondents would find it more difficult to coop-
erate well and achieve strong performances.
Table 5. Control variables.
Variables Term Item
1. Project phase PPH What activities in the project are already completed?
2. Technical complexity TCO The project is characterized by a high [low] technical complexity
3. Organizational background ORG In what type of organization do you work?
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Data analysis
The data have a nested structure because multiple respondents filled out the survey per
project. The individuals in the survey worked for projects, which themselves had
characteristics that may influence the study. Consequently, we have a two-level model
with measurements on person level (n = 144) and project level (n = 68), making it likely
for the answers of the respondents involved in the same project to be somewhat similar.
This conflicts with the idea that surveys should result in completely independent
observations. To account for the fact that there were multiple respondents for each of
the projects, we performed a multilevel analysis instead of a regular regression analysis.
As hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) is much better suited to dealing with multilevel
analysis, HLM was used to test our hypothesis. In order to find a statistical justification
for running HLM, the null models were provided (see Appendix B for the tests). As the
chi-square tests for both dependent variables were significant, there was variance in the
outcome variable by the level-2 groupings (project level). The results of both the test
using performance as a variable (x2 (49) = 119.73, p < .001) and the test using cooperation
as a variable (x2 (49) = 107.36, p < .001) supported the use of HLM. Examination of the
between-project and within-project variance components of the variables also justified
the multilevel approach in HLM. The scores of individuals within projects were sig-
nificantly more similar than the scores of individuals between the different projects. For
perceived project performance, the within-project variance was 40%.1 This result sug-
gests that 40% of the variance in perceived project performance is attributable to group
membership. Sixty per cent of the variance was at individual level. For cooperation, the
intercept resulted only in a slightly lower within-project variance of 36%.2 These levels of
within-project variance justify the multilevel approach. To test our hypotheses, the full
maximum likelihood procedure in HLM was used.
Common method bias
In the survey used in this article, respondents answered questions regarding both the
dependent and the independent variables. There is therefore a risk of inflated
relationships between the variables, as a result of the measurement method causing
variance. This means that there could potentially be a measurement error, one of the
errors described in the total survey error framework (see, for example, Lee, Benoit-
Bryan, and Johnson 2012). In this section, we address some measures in order to deal
with the potential presence of common method bias.
As most of the variables in this study are based on individuals’ perceptions, our
variables are by their very nature perceptual (George and Pandey 2017). Although
this does not imply that common method bias is not an issue, it means that using a
survey, even though it is a single data source, may still be an appropriate method
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012). A few characteristics of our survey
limited the possibility of common method bias and other survey-related errors. First,
by approaching almost the entire population, there is no chance of sampling errors in
this study. Moreover, some procedural remedies were used to minimize potential
common source bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012; Lee, Benoit-Bryan,
and Johnson 2012; George and Pandey 2017). These include the use of different scales
(both 10-point and 5-point Likert scales) and making sure that not all variables are
presented on the same page of the questionnaire. With regard to common method
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variance, the correlation table (Appendix A) shows a medium and significant effect
between the main variables; this indicates that there is no strong inflation of the
existence of common method variations to create strong common source bias.
Finally, to test whether common method bias was a problem, we conducted a
Lindell and Whitney’s test, the results (see Appendix C) of which show that common
method bias is not an issue in this paper.
Results
In this section, the results of the analysis are presented. In order to study the role of
trust and network management, two multilevel analyses were conducted. The first
analysis used perceived project performance as the dependent variable. The second
one focused on good cooperation as the dependent variable.
The relationship between trust, management, and perceived project
performance
First, the role of trust and management with regard to perceived PPP project
performance was studied. The results, presented in Table 6, show that both trust
and management are correlated with the perceived performance of PPP projects. The
coefficient score indicates that, when respondents score the independent variable one
point higher, this also has a positive effect on perceived performance of the project –
the dependent variable. This is true for both trust (p < 0.05) and management
(p < 0.01), but management in particular is strongly related to perceived PPP
performance. Moreover, the technical complexity (p < 0.001) of the project is also
positively associated with perceived performance at the .001 level. When PPP projects
are assessed as more complex by respondents, the higher their perceived performance
for this project is. This might be related to the possible connections between various
elements of the project. Technically more complex projects usually are projects where
more different environmental aspects are combined. This is what makes the project
more (technically) complex, but it also provides more possibilities for win–win
situations and solving more than one (spatial) problem at once. Thus, these projects
have more potential for good performance.
Table 6. Multilevel analysis of perceived performance of PPP projects.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-Value
Intercept 2.283 0.231 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.073 0.102 0.478
Individual level
Technical complexity 0.060 0.017 0.001***
Trust 0.070 0.030 0.024*
Management 0.208 0.074 0.007**
Organizational background −0.083 0.084 0.330
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
12 R. WARSEN ET AL.
The relationship between trust, management, and cooperation in PPP projects
PPPs are considered successful not only because of the way stakeholders perceive
their project’s performance, but also because of the way public and private actors
cooperate during the process. Therefore, this section focuses on the role of trust and
management in the cooperation between public and private actors in PPP projects.
The analysis shows a slightly different result than the previous analysis focusing on
PPP performance. In the first analysis, both trust and management were positively
associated with the perceived performance of PPP projects. With regard to the
cooperation of public and private actors within PPP projects, only trust is signifi-
cantly correlated (p < .001) to the perceived cooperation in the projects (see Table 7).
So, to ensure a smooth process and good cooperation between actors in PPPs, a high
level of trust between actors seems to be very important.
The analysis also indicates that no control variable (respondents’ organizational
background, technical complexity of the project, and project phase) is significantly
related to the cooperation between public and private actors in the project.
More strikingly, the analysis shows that – in contrast to trust – management
is not associated with good cooperation. As the variable management includes
management strategies aimed at cooperation between partners, such as involving
partners in project management decisions, communication between actors, and
aligning conflicting interests, the result is surprising. In order to clarify the
relation between management and cooperation, the role of trust herein should
be studied more closely. As trust is strongly related with the cooperation of
actors in PPP projects, management may be indirectly associated with coopera-
tion, because the various management activities may influence the amount of
trust between partners. As stated in the section on ‘Network management,’
building trust is one of the many existing management activities. Therefore, a
Pearson’s correlation test of the relation between management and trust was
conducted; Table 8 shows the results. There is a moderate (0.438) yet significant
(p < .001) correlation between management and trust. This suggests that man-
agement could indeed be indirectly correlated with the cooperation between
actors in PPPs by increasing trust between those actors.
Finally, a multilevel analysis (see Table 9) was run to assess the relationship between
good cooperation and perceived performance in PPP projects. The analysis shows that
good cooperation in PPP projects is associated with perceived performance of these
Table 7. Multilevel analysis of cooperation in PPP projects.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-Value
Intercept 2.210 0.566 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.195 0.144 0.182
Individual level
Technical complexity −0.011 0.036 0.773
Trust 0.124 0.036 0.001***
Management 0.120 0.144 0.407
Organizational background −0.207 0.143 0.154
***p < .001.
N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 13
projects (p < .01). This means that the higher individuals score cooperation with
partners, the better their perception of the performance of the PPP project. Both the
technical complexity of the project and management are positively associated with
perceived performance, although the level of significance of network management
differs slightly compared to the original analysis (.05 rather than .01). Note that trust
is no longer significantly correlated with perceived performance now that cooperation
is added to the analysis.
Conclusions and reflections
From our analysis, we conclude that trust and management are important for both
the perceived PPP performance and the cooperation between actors in those projects.
Trust is associated with both perceived performance and cooperation. Network
management is associated only with perceived performance. However, as the correla-
tion test shows that management is correlated with trust, it may therefore be
indirectly related with the cooperation between actors in PPPs via trust.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that cooperation is positively associated with
performance.
These results show the relevance of relational characteristics, to which limited
attention was given at the start of the PPP debate. Initially, attention focused strongly
on performance indicators, contract characteristics, and performance monitoring as
important conditions for the success of PPPs. The results of this study, however,
show that relational characteristics are at least as important and may even be more
important, because recent research casts doubt on the influence of, for instance,
Table 8. Correlation between management and trust.
Variables Management Trust
Pearson’s correlation 1 .438***
Management Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 121 121
Pearson’s correlation .438*** 1
Trust Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 121 121
***p < .001.
Table 9. Multilevel analysis of cooperation, trust, and network management on perceived PPP
project performance.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-Value
Intercept 1.938 0.274 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.029 0.102 0.780
Individual level
Technical complexity 0.063 0.016 <0.001***
Trust 0.048 0.029 0.101
Cooperation 0.176 0.061 0.006**
Management 0.171 0.065 0.012*
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
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contract characteristics (see Klijn and Koppenjan 2016b). Given the complexity of
PPP projects and their often strong relation with their environment, and thus other
affected stakeholders, this is not surprising however. PPP projects are of long dura-
tion, and many unexpected things can happen. This means that constant nurturing of
the partnership, the ability to cope with unexpected events that are not specified in
the contract, and managing relations are crucial for the project’s success. On the basis
of this study, this suggestion seems to hold for PPPs.
Of course, this research has its limitations. The study is based on a survey and thus
on respondents’ perceptions of PPP performance and the influencing factors. This
also means that we have data on a very large number of projects, which is an asset,
but we do not have in-depth detailed information about these cases. Also, we now
know that management matters, but not the type of management strategies that are
effective, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, as both the dependent vari-
ables (perceived project performance and cooperation) and the independent variables
(trust and management) are measured using the same survey, common method bias
might occur. We tested for this with a marker variable, and that showed that
common method bias probably is not a very big problem. Another issue is that we
had only one item available for measuring trust, whereas many authors argue that
trust has several dimensions (see Sako 1998; Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010).
Finally, we should address the fact that the cross-sectional nature of our data
implicates that causality and endogeneity cannot be ruled out. Although this should
not stop researchers from doing this type of research, it means that the results of our
study should be viewed in terms of correlations between variables, rather than precise
effects. Therefore, we suggest the use of longitudinal data or survey experiments to
deal with these issues in further research into this topic.
Despite these limitations, this article generates some very interesting results
that contribute to the discussion about the conditions under which PPPs are
effective and produce good outcomes. It nuances the early PPP literature and
sets the stage for further research on the relational aspects of partnerships.
Further research should perhaps focus on the precise interplay between (network)
management and trust and also on their combined influence. It may very well be
that, for instance, one of these conditions is very crucial for the other to have
effect. Multiple case studies and qualitative comparative analysis could provide
more precise answers to this question. This type of research may gain more in-
depth knowledge about the quality of the relationships in PPPs and the manage-
ment strategies that may contribute to this.
Notes
1. Level 1 intercept variance divided by the total variance: .09961/(.09961 + .24603) = .404869.
2. Level 1 intercept variance divided by the total variance: .21086/(.21086 + .37682) = .35880.
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Appendix A. Means, standard deviations, and correlations (N = 94)
Appendix B. The intercept only
The intercept only with the outcome variable ‘perceived project performance’ (PER1)
Summary of the model specified
Level-1 Model
PER1ij = β0j + rij
Level-2 Model
β0j = γ00 + u0j
Mixed Model
PER1ij = γ00 + u0j+ rij
Final Results
σ2 = 0.14642
Standard error of σ2 = 0.02613
τ
INTRCPT1, β0 0.09961
Standard error of τ
INTRCPT1, β0 0.03724
The value of the log-likelihood function at iteration 8 = −7.179775E+001
Table B1. Intercept only ‘perceived project performance.’
Random level-1 coefficient Reliability estimate
INTRCPT1, β0 0.552
Table B2. Final estimation of fixed effects.
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error t-Ratio Approx. d.f. p-Value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 3.997710 0.060063 66.558 49 <0.001
Table B3. Final estimation of fixed effects (with robust standard errors).
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error t-Ratio Approx. d.f. p-Value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 3.997710 0.060057 66.566 49 <0.001
Table B4. Final estimation of variance components.
Random effect Standard deviation Variance component d.f. χ2 p-Value
INTRCPT1, u0 0.31561 0.09961 49 119.73308 <0.001
Level-1, r 0.38264 0.14642
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Perceived performance 3.98 0.49 1
2. Cooperation 3.39 0.75 0.46*** 1
3. Management 3.89 0.58 0.37*** 0.30** 1
4. Trust 6.71 1.95 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 1
5. Technical complexity 7.31 2.13 0.30** 0.02 0.04 0.08 1
6. Project phase (1 = building finished) 0.36 0.48 0.27** 0.23* 0.13 0.20 0.02 1
7. Organizational background
(1 = public partner)
0.48 0.50 −0.16 −0.15 −0.03 0.05 −0.18 −0.10 1
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
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The intercept only with the outcome variable ‘cooperation’ (SAM1)
Summary of the model specified
Level-1 Model
SAM1ij = β0j + rij
Level-2 Model
β0j = γ00 + u0j
Mixed Model
SAM1ij = γ00 + u0j+ rij
Final Results
σ2 = 0.37682
Standard error of σ2 = 0.06858
τ
INTRCPT1, β0 0.21086
Standard error of τ
INTRCPT1, β0 0.08733
The value of the log-likelihood function at iteration 17 = −1.172110E + 002.
Table B6. Final estimation of fixed effects.
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard Error t-Ratio Approx. d.f. p-Value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 3.373292 0.091571 36.838 49 <0.001
Table B8. Final estimation of variance components.
Random effect Standard deviation Variance component d.f. χ2 p-Value
INTRCPT1, u0 0.45919 0.21086 49 107.36216 <0.001
level-1, r 0.61386 0.37682
Table B5. Intercept only ‘cooperation.’
Random level-1 coefficient Reliability estimate
INTRCPT1, β0 0.503
Table B7. Final estimation of fixed effects (with robust standard errors).
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error t-Ratio Approx. d.f. p-Value
For INTRCPT1, β0
INTRCPT2, γ00 3.373292 0.091564 36.841 49 <0.001
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Appendix C
The Lindell and Whitney test uses a theoretically unrelated construct as a marker variable to adjust
the correlations between the principal constructs. Any high correlation among these items would be
an indicator of common method bias. We used a survey variable that is not used in this study to
answer our research question as a marker (to what extent are societal groups involved?). Table C1
shows the correlation coefficients and the R2 between variables in the model and the marker. The
highest value corresponds to the perceived performance variable. The R2 of this correlation coeffi-
cient shows the maximum percentage of variance shared between factors. If common sources bias
were a concern, we would obtain high levels of dependency between factors and the marker. In our
study however, a low level of common source effect is shared between constructs (R2 = 0.025).
Table C1. Correlation and R2 between variables and marker.
Variables in the model Pearson’s coefficient R2
Cooperation 0.128 0.016
Perceived performance 0.158 0.025
Management 0.034 0.001
Trust 0.056 0.003
Organizational background −0.111 0.012
Project phase −0.127 0.016
Technical complexity 0.073 0.005
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